

MADHVA'S CONCEPTION OF SVATANTRA

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MADHVA lived in the thirteenth century A.D. He is the last of the originators of Vedanta systems. Coming last he has a definite advantage over his predecessors. Having studied both their merits and defects he has propounded a system of Vedanta which has so far proved the last word in Vedanta.

1. Svatantra, the One Principle of All

Madhva teaches that the Cause, Source, Ground, Principle, Substance, Basis, Truth or Reality of all that is the world is essentially one. Following the Vedas, he names this Cause *Svatantra*, *Brahman*, *Parabrahman*, *Ātman*, *Viṣṇu*, *Nārāyaṇa*, *Hari*, *Īśvara*, *Parameśvara*, *Vāsudeva* and so on. In the course of his thought Madhva constantly makes use of the conception of *Svatantra*, explains its significance, and, on its basis, justifies the various aspects of the ultimate Reality that underlies all. The term *svatantra* is a compound of *sva* and *tantra* and it means *svādhīna*, the Independent. This implies that the source of all is self-established, self-evident, unbound and all-complete. These are the various aspects signified by the various other Vedic names, *Brahman* and so on. *Svatantra* as the source of all reality is the giver of the reality of all. This means that all else is *paratantra*, or *parādhīna*.

Madhva's teaching is purely a philosophical justification of *Svatantra* with all its implications. He shows also that *Śruti* and *Smṛti* reveal the truth of *Svatantra* only and that their teaching expresses the conclusion of the philosophy he expounds. This is the reason why he constantly makes a reference to the texts of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* in his works. We must not infer from this that he reads his own ideas into *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. Whenever he defines an idea presented by a *Śruti*, he gives not only the philosophical justification of the idea, but the support of other passages of *Śruti* which state the same idea more clearly. This is why he quotes profusely from *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. Thus his teaching by way of giving a self-complete system of philosophy makes the several texts of *Śruti* a consistent whole. This is an attempt at presenting a philosophy which holds true at all times and in all circumstances.

As regards the history of philosophy that preceded him, he notes the following: The Vedas started the real philosophical enquiry as expressed

in such passages as "From which all these creatures come into being, by which they are living and into which they enter and disappear, reflect on That. That is Brahman" (*Tai.*).¹ The sole purpose of the whole Veda is to study the various aspects of Brahman, the Ground of all. This is the teaching of the passage "All the Vedas reveal the truth of Brahman."² The *Smṛtis* illustrate the truth taught by the Veda. *Bhāgavata* says "*Dravya, Karma, Kāla, Svabhāva, Jīva* and *Prakṛti* (all the items of the world) exist because of the desire of Brahman. And if Brahman is indifferent to them they do not exist."³ The *Gītā* says "I am the creator of all."⁴ The teaching of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* is confirmed by the *Brahmasūtra*: "That from which this world has production and so on is Brahman."⁵ The manner in which the Truth is taught in these works is highly significant. They hold that the cause of all is Brahman but not that Brahman is the cause of all. This circumstance indicates better the spirit of the teaching which is that the whole universe is an expression, work or a product of a single principle and this is named Brahman.

Next followed the *Darśanas* including the schools of Vedānta. Their originators failed to see fully the significance of the lead given by the Vedic tradition. Each in the course of his thought somehow developed an undue interest in some aspect of the world or other and made much of it. Cārvāka denied *cetana* and made *svabhāva*, an aspect of matter, the principle of all. Bauddha denied the world of actual experience and made *śūnya* the ultimate. Jaina began to explain everything with his *syādvāda* and ended by saying that nothing can be really explained. *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *Pūrvaṃmīmāṃsā* assumed several self-established realities together with *Īśvara* or *Karma* as a connecting link. Though *Sāṅkhya* spoke of two principles, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, it attributed all creative activity to *prakṛti* and made *puruṣa* practically a non-entity. None of these schools respected the spirit of *Brahmavāda* started by the Vedas. This circumstance gave rise to the idea of re-establishing the old *Brahmavāda*. There appeared several schools of Vedānta. But they formed only the basis for the greater systematisation of Vedic thought at the hands of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. But even they did not do proper justice to the Vedic spirit of finding out the single principle of all. Śāṅkara found it impossible to justify *Brahmavāda* without mixing it with *Māyāvāda*. Just as it is with *Sāṅkhya*, Śāṅkara attributed all creative activity to *māyā* or *avidyā* and reduced Brahman practically to the position of *Sāṅkhya puruṣa*. Similarly Rāmānuja found it impossible to explain the origin of the world without giving Brahman the assistance of *sūkṣmadacit*. Whatever be the importance given to the name Brahman in these systems, they have posited something other than Brahman as the origin of the world and have thus abandoned the pure *Brahmavāda* taught by the Vedas.

By way of illustrating this point, *T. C.* 770 says⁶ (Śankara) denies that *pradhāna* is the cause of the world; but holds that the cause of the world is *avidyā*. This does not help *Brahmavāda*, i.e., it does not help the conception of Brahman as the only origin of all. The attempt found in *avidyāvāda* (*māyāvāda*) is like giving the sheep to a tiger after snatching it by force from a wolf. This passage compares creatorship to a sheep, *pradhāna* to a wolf and *māyā* to a tiger. The idea is this: whether a wolf eats the sheep or a tiger eats it, it is not saved. Similarly, whether the creatorship goes to *pradhāna* or to *māyā*, the result is the same, and Brahman as the creator of all is not maintained. With this observation the passage of *T. C.* reveals the vigour or spirit of Madhva's teaching.

Madhva makes nothing other than Brahman the source of the world. According to him, Brahman, and Brahman only, is the source of all and as such, It is *Svatantra* and It is therefore all that explains the world with all its aspects. For this reason Madhva calls It *Guṇapūrṇa* (all-complete).

Because Madhva speaks of Brahman as *Guṇapūrṇa*, his conception of Brahman must not be taken to be the same as *saguṇa* of Śankara. *Saguṇa* of Śankara is a product of *Brahman* and *māyā*. But *Guṇapūrṇa* of Madhva is the uncaused Cause of all. It is essentially One. It is an expression of complete identity. Madhva calls this identity *saviśeṣābheda*. He means that though this identity is essentially one, it admits of different expressions—the substantive and the attributive. He points out that this is the nature of every identical thing. Further, the higher conception of Brahman according to Śankara is *nirguṇa*. Madhva points out that the conception of *nirguṇa* involves self-contradiction, because to call something *nirguṇa* is to attribute *nirguṇatva* to it.

He shows how Brahman is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* by explaining how It is the cause of all. He distinguishes the two aspects of the world *cetana* and *acetana*, spirit and non-spirit. *Acetana* stands for *Prakṛti*, *Kāla*, *Deśa*, *Veda*, the products of *Prakṛti* and *abhāva*, absence of different kinds. *Cetana* stands for all *jīvas* including the *abhimānis*, the presiding deities of the various aspects of the world. He explains in every work of his, how Brahman is the sole creator of all this. His position as explained in *M. Bh.* with S. may be quoted: "Hari is the creator of all, *cetana* and *acetana*. This conviction occurs only to the good (*satām*) and it never occurs to the evil-minded (*asatām*). Hari creates *acetana* as *acetana*, i.e., without mixing it with *cetana*. But He creates *cetana* along with *acetana*, i.e., body. He is thus the cause of all. None else can be the cause of the world. Some think that *prakṛti*, etc., cause the world. They are wrong. *Prakṛti*, *Kāla*

etc., are products. They are created by Hari. Some say that Hari Himself changes into the world. Others believe that the creation is something like a dream or illusion. Both are wrong. Hari is changeless and He transcends illusion. The mere desire of Hari gives rise to the world. He is free from all defects. How then can He have change? Hari, the Changeless, desires. The world is really created. This is the teaching of the Veda. This is the conviction of *Caturmukha*, etc., who know the truth. It is illusion to think that something else is the cause of the world. Illusion is *dvaita*. It is created by Hari. It must therefore be destroyed by Himself. He destroys *dvaita*. He is therefore *Advaita*. If He has no desire to release *jīva* He creates *dva*. If He desires the release of *jīva* He destroys *dvaita*. Good *jīvas* never favor *dvaita*. They know that Hari destroys *dvaita*. Hari, Parabrahma is therefore *Advaita*."

This is the essence of Madhva's *Brahmavāda*. It traces everything of the world to the wish or desire (*icchā*) of Brahman. Brahman's wish is the sole cause of all. Brahman is therefore *Svatantra*. "To be *svatantra* is indeed to follow one's own desire."⁸

2. *Svatantra, the All that Explains All*

The cause of all must be *Svatantra*. This may be illustrated in the following manner: Cause in the ultimate sense is necessarily one. Two ultimate causes limit each other and each ceases to be ultimate. Further, the two causes must be brought together if they were to give rise to the world. The principle that brings them together becomes the ultimate cause of all and it is necessarily one.

The conception of one cause needs an explanation. We all commonly speak of *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes. Taking the production of a jar for example, we call the clay from which the jar comes *upādāna* and the jar-maker and so on that help the production of the jar *nimitta*. But the cause of all is neither *upādāna* nor *nimitta*. The cause of all is necessarily changeless. If it has change, then the change must be caused by something else. It is therefore no longer the cause of all. So the cause of all is not *upādāna*. Nor is it *nimitta*. For a *nimitta* cause cannot do anything without the help of *upādāna*. It cannot therefore be the one cause of all.

The cause of all does not depend on anything else. It is independent. It is called *Svatantra Kāraṇa*. In the same sense it is often called simply cause—*kāraṇa*, *nimitta* and so on.

Svatantra Kāraṇa or in short, *Svatantra* cannot be *acetana*, because *acetana* cannot cause anything. When *acetana* appears to do anything, what actually

takes place is that a *cetana* works through it. *Svatantra* is therefore *cetana*. This means that It has knowledge, desire and will, the several aspects of *cetana*. Further, *Svatantra* is the cause of the *cetana* aspect of the world. This also proves that It is *cetana*.

Thus the very conception of *Svatantra* implies that Brahman, the cause, is uncaused, unconditioned, unlimited and unaided by anything else. Brahman is thus absolutely changeless. Even the fact that It causes all must not be taken to mean change in It, because with change It cannot be *Svatantra* as change implies a cause of change. Brahman as *Svatantra* is thus self-established. If It were not self-established It cannot be *Svatantra*. N. S. says conclusion of this discussion: "Therefore the cause of all must be taken be *Svatantra*. That alone is indeed *Īśvara*".⁹

The truth that Brahman is *Svatantra* implies that the world is caused, conditioned, limited and aided. It is nothing but change. Its reality is therefore derived from Brahman. For this reason the world is called *paratantra*. Thus according to Madhva, *Svatantra* is cause and *paratantra* product and *Svatantra* is the cause of all that occurs to *paratantra*.

Madhva distinguishes eight aspects that occur to *paratantra*, viz., production, living, destruction, direction, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and release (*sr̥ṣṭi*, *sthiti*, *samhāra*, *niyamana*, *jnāna*, *ajnāna*, *bandha* and *moksha*). The first four and non-knowledge in the sense of the absence of knowledge occur to *acetana* and all the eight aspects occur to *cetana*. Of them, production (*sr̥ṣṭi*) consists in the reception of *sattā* (being or reality) from *Svatantra*. T. S. T. says that *sr̥ṣṭi* is *sattālābha*, reception of *sattā*.¹⁰ *Svatantra* as the giver of *sattā* is the creator of all. The same idea may be extended to the other seven aspects. To give them to the world is to give them *sattā*. This is how *Svatantra* is characterised as the creator of the eightfold aspect of the world. For this reason *Svatantra* is called *Īśvara*.

The term *sattā* in this connection means *svārūpa* (essence), *pramiti* or *prameyatva* (the state of being known), *pravṛtti* (function) and existence in space and time. Only from *Īśvara* does everything in the world receive *sattā* in all these four senses and with reference to every aspect that occurs to it. For this reason everything is called *adhīna* (dependent). *Īśvara* as the giver of *sattā* in these various senses is called *Niyāmaka*. Madhva says in *Ai. Bh.* 37, "By explaining creation, etc., as occurring to the world, the text proves *adhīnatva* (the dependent nature) of the world".¹¹

To hold that the *Kāraṇa* of all is *Svatantra* and that *Svatantra* is Brahman implies that it is the very nature of Brahman to create. Brahman as *Svatantra* is unconditioned. Space, time, etc., never condition *Svatantra*. *Svatantra*

is thus self-established always and everywhere as the cause of all time and all space. *Br. Bh.* 9-15 says, "Because It is eternally existent It is called *Ātman* Hari is *Ātman* because He is All-pervading, All-infinite and All-knowing."¹² These are the expressions of the infinite nature of His creatorship. This implies that the process of the world-creation is beginningless and endless—*anādi* and *nitya*. For this reason the Veda speaks of the *nitya* character of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *kāla* and so on; but at the same time it distinguishes *Svatantra* as the *Nitya* of the *nitya* things (*Nityonityānām*). This means that It is the giver of *nityatva* to the *nitya* things of the world.

Svatantra is thus the source of all that the world has. This implies that It is all-complete in every sense of the term. This aspect of *Svatantra* is called *Guṇapūrṇa*. This is the significance of Brahman as conceived by the Veda. The idea that Brahman is *Guṇapūrṇa* is justified by the idea that It is *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* signifies all-creatorship. The knowledge of Brahman as *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* therefore presupposes a correct understanding of the creatorship of Brahman.

How the knowledge of creatorship leads to the knowledge of *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* is explained by *T. C.* 332, "*Īśvara* creates not only the properties of *cetana* but also those of *acetana*. When it is understood that *cetana* itself is dependent on Him, i.e., created by Him, there is no difficulty in holding that He is the creator of *acetana*. The fact that *Īśvara* creates both *cetana* and *acetana* points to His *Guṇapūrṇatva*. This may be illustrated by taking for example an *acetana*, say space (*ākāśa*). In understanding the fact that *Īśvara's* creation of *ākāśa* points to His *Guṇapūrṇatva*, the following difficulty may be felt:—*Ākāśa* is *acetana*. Its property, say, room-making, is therefore *acetana*. To create this property which is *acetana* does not mean the completeness (*pūrṇatva*) of this property in *Īśvara* (because *Īśvara* is *cetana*). Further, room-making is the very essence (*svabhāva*) of *ākāśa*. An essence must not be conditioned by anything. To hold therefore that *Īśvara* creates it cannot be justified. This difficulty is met as follows:—*Īśvara* wishes that *ākāśa* must have room-making. *Ākāśa* has this property. If *Īśvara* had a different desire *ākāśa* would have been solid (*nibiḍa*). Further, even after creating *ākāśa*, *Īśvara* has the power completely to destroy the room-making of *ākāśa* and make it solid. He has not done it, because He has not wished it. If even men can with the help of some chemical make copper non-copper, cannot *Īśvara* do room-making non-room making? Though *Īśvara* has not destroyed *ākāśa* He has the power to do it. He has indeed the power to do anything He pleases. *Śruti* and *Smṛti* also teach that the essence of everything is created by Him. 'The rivers flow because of His command; the wind blows because of His fear. And *ākāśa* gives room for

creatures because it is His will.' Therefore Īśvara's creation of room-making in *ākāśa* points to the completeness of room-making in Him. So the term *ākāśa* with the completeness of its meaning applies to Īśvara. It is applied to *ākāśa* only in a very limited sense. It is therefore said that Īśvara has the *guṇas* of all creatures. N.S. says 'Room-making in *ākāśa* is limited by space and time. *Ākāśa* with its room-making is therefore the creation of Īśvara. It is an expression of Īśvara who is immanent in it. This immanence is itself a form of His.' So to establish that room-making which forms an essence of an *acetana* has in view the determination of the divine properties, both room-making and the power of creating the very essence of things. The same way of thinking must be extended to all items of creation. Therefore the term *ākāśa* means primarily Brahman."¹³

Īśvara is the creator not only of positive entities, but also of the negative ones. T. C. 835 says, "The horn of a hare is eternally absent. Its absence is the creation of Īśvara. If Īśvara had desired its existence it would have been there. Īśvara did not desire it and it is eternally absent."¹⁴ So nothing in the world is uncreated. "Īśvara as the creator of all is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*. For this reason *Śruti* calls the Creator Brahman.

3. Svatantra, the Cause of Causes

We have noted that Īśvara's creative activity is at work through the whole course of eternity. This implies that particular aspects of the world are made to continue from the beginningless to the endless time. This is also proved by our experience. Every product we observe has a previous and a later state. Before a jar is produced, there is in its place clay and clay is the later state of the jar when destroyed. So N. S. 422 says, "Everything is *nitya* in substance and *anitya* with regard to its change."¹⁵ This idea holds true with regard to the whole of creation. Creation of the world presupposes the existence of the substantive aspect of things and the destruction of the world is followed by the same aspect. Even to maintain the existence of these aspects is the work of Īśvara. It is therefore held that Īśvara creates the world by making use of the elements that are already existent, *i.e.*, the elements to which Īśvara has already given existence. These elements are *prakṛti* (the root matter), *deśa* (space), *kāla* (time), and *cetana* (spirit).

The fact that Īśvara creates things making use of the things that are already existent does not in any manner modify the creatorship of Īśvara. N. S. 293 says, "Though Hari is able to create things without making use of anything, He always creates this world from the things that are already existent. Even this rule is His desire."¹⁶ And in fact "To make use of *prakṛti*, etc., in producing the world illustrates really His unlimited creatorship. (*Prakṛti*,

etc., are therefore said to be the causes of the world.) But these causes are after all His creation." This indeed points to the richness of His omnipotence (*aiśvarya*).¹⁷ N. S. 299 says, "(Actually the order of creation is this—From *Prakṛti* comes *mahat*, from *mahat ahankāra* and so on. *Prakṛti* is *upādāna*, and *kāla*, etc., are *nimitta*.) But Hari is quite able to create *ahan-kāra* from *prakṛti* and *mahat* from *ahankāra*, and to make *prakṛti nimitta* and *kāla*, etc., *upādāna*. Yet Hari always creates the world following the order he pleases." "This is the conclusion. If it is asked whether Hari makes use of *upādāna* and *nimitta*—the answer is, yes. He makes use of them. So in this limited sense, *prakṛti*, etc., may be said to be the causes of the world. But it must not be supposed that *Īśvara* is not able to create the world either without making use of them or making use of them in a different manner. Therefore *Īśvara* the creator must not be compared to a pot-maker. It does not therefore follow that He is not *Svatantra* and *Prakṛti*, etc., are not *paratantra*. What then is the origin of creation? The origin is His desire. This proves that He is *Svatantra*. Even though He makes use of *prakṛti*, etc., they are not uncreated by Him. How is then His overflow of omnipotence or creatorship modified? *Prakṛti*, etc., are indeed produced by Him. Therefore to make use of them points to the richness of His creatorship. Madhva proves it thus: "Because the very causeness of causes is given by Him, His making use of causes proves the richness of His creatorship."¹⁸

In this connection we have to note the following: From the point of view of Brahman's creatorship, the so-called causes of the world are only products. To make use of them in the creation of fresh things is only to make use of products in producing fresh products from them. But the real cause of even these fresh products is *Īśvara* Himself, because the creation of these products is after all the result of His wish. So, just as *Īśvara* is the giver of reality to *prakṛti*, etc., He is the Giver of reality to *Mahat* also. And just as *Mahat*, etc., are products, *prakṛti*, etc., also are products. What is meant in these passages is that there is nothing in this world that is self-established, or that has reality independent of Brahman or that does not receive reality from Brahman. For this reason, the whole world is called *paratantra*. *Paratantra* means product (*kārya*). It receives reality from *Īśvara*. This means that *Īśvara* who gives reality to the world, and who is uncaused and therefore has self-established Reality, is *Svatantra*. Only Brahman is *Svatantra* and all else is *paratantra*.

In T. S., Madhva speaks of two *tattvas*, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*. *Svatantra* is that the Reality of which is self-established and *paratantra* is that the reality of which is derived from *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* is *Kāraṇa* and *paratantra* is *kārya*. *Tattva* in this connection means *Prameya*.¹⁹ *Prameya*

is the object of correct knowledge. Though both *Svatantra* and *paratantra* are called *prameya*, it must not be forgotten that *Svatantra* is the object in the highest sense. The *Śruti* says, "Nārāyaṇa is Mahājneya" (the object of objects). This means that Nārāyaṇa is the Giver of objectivity to objects and He is therefore the Ground of objects. His objectivity is self-established. He is *Svatantra*. So, the mention of two *tattvas*, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*, has in view the establishment of *Svatantra* as the Ground of all and this is done by showing that all else is *paratantra*.

4. *Svatantra, the Eternal of the Eternals*

Madhva's position that all that is other than Brahman is *paratantra* means that all without any exception is actually created by Brahman. In opposition to this truth *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, etc., hold that there are items of the world that are beginningless (*anādi*) and therefore not produced; *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* speaks of *paramāṇus*, the indivisible and indestructible units of matter, space, time and so on, which are in themselves *anādi* and therefore uncreated. *Sāṅkhya* calls the root-matter *prakṛti* in the sense that it is uncaused (*anādi*) but is the cause of all that is produced (*vikṛti* or *sādi*). Madhva holds that even the so-called *anādi* things are essentially the creation of Īśvara. In explaining this position *T. C.* 379 notes—"Īśvara has the power to do, undo and do in any manner He pleases. Even the so-called *anādi* things are therefore His creation, just in the same way as the *sādi* things are. The power of Īśvara is unmodified and unopposed in every sense. This truth may be illustrated in the following manner. We believe that the past existed in space. But Īśvara has the power to make the past without space. He has not done so because it is not His desire. This is proved by the experience that the past was in space. We must not imagine that He cannot meddle with the past. This imagination is opposed to His creatorship (*aīśvarya*) and it is sublated by the *Śruti* which says that *svabhāva*, *jīva*, *karma* and so on, exist because of His desire. The supposition that the *anādi* things must have their own *anādi* essence (*svabhāva*) does not in any way modify the creatorship of Īśvara, because His desire which produces *anādi* essence of *anādi* things is also *anādi*. In a previous section called *Ākāśādhikaraṇa*, the truth that the essence of all things is the work of Īśvara is proved. In the present passage the fact that *anādi* essence is the work of Īśvara is established. So this passage supplements the previous one. In a later division called *viyatpāda*, it is established that the production of everything in the world consists in its receiving a change which is the work of Īśvara. Production in this sense is called *parādhīna viśeṣāvṛpti*. But the special teaching of the present passage is this—Some items of the world may not admit of creation in the sense of coming into existence only at a point

of time and for this reason they may be taken to be *anādi*. But their very essence, *i.e.*, their reality, is created by Īśvara. The fact that Īśvara is the creator of *anādi* essence of *anādi* things proves the transcendence (*māhātmya*) of Īśvara and it is the same as *anādi svabhāva niyāmaka śakti*, the power of creating *anādisvabhāva*. This means that the term *anādi* applies in the primary sense only to Īśvara.”²⁰

The statement that Īśvara has the power to make the past spaceless is really very significant. On the basis of actual experience even though we believe that the past existed in space, Īśvara has the power of making this belief or experience wrong or even impossible. This means that the correctness of correct knowledge also is dependent on Him, *i.e.*, made by Him. Further, this passage interprets production as *parādhīna viśeṣāvāpti*. The significance of this interpretation will be explained shortly.

So far, it has been shown that the creative power of Īśvara is absolute and unconditioned in every sense. This must not be taken to mean that chaos prevails in the world. Madhva assures us that Īśvara's desire is *satya*. The word *satya* in this connection means consistent. Consistency is an item of all-completeness (*guṇapūrṇatva*) of Īśvara. This enables us to take it for granted that Īśvara gives no room for any kind of disorder or confusion in the world. *Bh. Bh.* 21. 18 says, “The process of this world is *anādi* and *nitya*. It is never destroyed and never confused. Like the flow of a river it is always in order. Nobody, whatever his power be, can interfere with the order of the world, because *Viṣṇu* is *Satya*, *Śrī* is *satya* and *jīva* and *jaḍa* are *satya*, that which is known is *satya* and there is nothing *asatya*. One who knows *Viṣṇu* consistently with these ideas attains *mukti* and goes to *Puruṣottama*.”²¹ One must not forget that in this passage the word *Viṣṇu* means *Guṇapūrṇa* and the word *Puruṣottama* means the highest principle of all. The statement that *Viṣṇu* is *satya* therefore means that He is the giver of *satyatva* to other things. The other entities are helplessly *satya* because *Viṣṇu* is *Satya*. *Ai. Bh.* 30 says, “*Hari* is *Nirdoṣa* and *Guṇapūrṇa*, because He is the Giver of *satyatva* to all (that is given as *satya*).”²²

Because Madhva holds that the process of the world is *anādi* and *ananta* and that Īśvara creates it by making use of certain elements such as *prakṛti* which are taken to be *anādi* and *nitya*, it is often found necessary to explain repeatedly how the *anādi* things are produced. Some important ideas in this connection may be mentioned. In the first place, the idea that Īśvara creates *anādi* things is not new to the Darśanas. In the Vedānta of Śankara the distinction between *jīva* and Brahman is taken to be *anādi*; yet it is considered to be the creation of *avidyā*. According to *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika dra-
vyatva* is *anādi*; but it is conditioned by *guṇavatva* (the state of having *guṇa*.)²³

And in the second place, from the standpoint of *Brahmavāda* the *anādi* items of the world are never considered to be *anādi* in the sense that they oppose or modify the creatorship *kartṛtva* of Brahman. The *Brahma Sūtra* teaches that *prakṛti*, etc., are *anādi* only in a secondary (*gauṇī*) sense. Brahman alone is *anādi* in the primary sense. The so-called *anādi* things of the world undergo constant change. They are *vikāri*. It is evident that they are interdependent and therefore limited (*vibhakta*). These facts prove that they are products. This means that their cause is necessarily changeless (*nirvikāra*) and unlimited (*pūrṇa*). Therefore that which is *nirvikāra* and *pūrṇa* is Brahman. So Brahman is not a product and It is only cause.²⁴

Further, the term *anādi* as applied both to Brahman and the world has different implications. The world as *anādi* means that it exists from the beginningless time. This means that it is in time. But Brahman is the creator of time itself. There is no sense in holding that It exists in time. The fact that the world exists in time means that time is the support (*ādhāra*) of the world. But Brahman is the support of all. This is an implication of the truth that It creates all. Further to hold that Brahman exists in time is to make time the support of Brahman. This is to deny Brahman and make time Brahman. The *Śruti* says: "*Sadeva Somyedamagra āsīt*," and so on. The apparent meaning of this is that Brahman (*Sat*) was prior to this world. But, because time is one of the items of the world, the real meaning of the *Śruti* must be that Brahman transcends time, because It is the creator of time. So, the term *agra* in the *Śruti* does not mean priority in time; it means *guṇapūrṇa*. The whole passage means that *guṇapūrṇa* is the presupposition of the world (*Ai. Bh.*).²⁵ So, the statement that Brahman is *anādi* must be finally taken to mean that It is the giver of *anādītva* to *anādi*. This is an implication of the fact that It is the creator of *anādi*. *Anu. V. i. i. ii* says, "such is the creatorship of Brahman." *N. S.* interprets this passage as "the creative power of *Īśvara* has in view everything, the eternal, the non-eternal, the essence, the non-essence, etc. If anything is excepted, His creatorship becomes modified. What then does this power do? It is the Giver of the very reality of these things. Is not the reality of these things *anādi*? Yes, it is. But it is so because of the *anādi* creatorship of *Īśvara*."²⁶

All these ideas clearly show that Brahman, and Brahman alone, is the cause of the world and that there is nothing in the world that is not uncreated. The objects of the world seem to be produced by means of other objects of the world. But we have seen how even this is the desire of *Īśvara*. The various entities that help the production of an object may seem to bind it. But even this binding is His creation. This implies how He binds everything but He is never bound by anything. *Br. Bh.* says, "He gives causeness to causes.

How then can the causes help Him ?”²⁷ N. S. 19 says, “All causes have their existence, function, etc., from Him. Therefore no effect is produced without His desire.”²⁸ He is therefore the only cause of all. As the only cause, He is completely unbound. For this reason, He is called *Svatantra*. This term implies two ideas: (1) He is uncaused, *i.e.*, self-established. (2) He acts purely according to His desire, *i.e.*, His desire is the source of all. Both these ideas are, as a rule, involved in defining Brahman as *Svatantra*.

Brahman’s creation has a much wider scope than has appeared so far. Creation is defined as giving of *sattā*, etc. (*sattādidāna*). *Sattā*, etc., stand for *satta*, *pramiti*, and *pravṛtti*. In some passages, *svarūpa* is mentioned in place of *sattā*. N. S. 330 says, “Some thinkers hold that *svarūpa* is *sattā*, others *pramāṇayogyatva* (the state of being revealed by *pramāṇa*) and some others *arthakriyākāritva* (the state of producing something). All these are found in the objects and they are created by Him.”²⁹ N. S. 513 says, “the property that is special or peculiar to a thing is called *svarūpa* or *svabhāva*. Everything possesses it. It is created by *Īśa*. If it were not created by Him, it would be *svatantra* and this affects the *Īśatva* of *Īśa*. To have an affected *Īśatva* is sublated by the *Śruti*, ‘All this is Brahman indeed’ (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*)”.³⁰ N. S. 166 says, “(To limit the creatorship of *Īśvara* is not justified). Take the case of a person, Devadatta. Only that thing the existence, knowledge and function of which Devadatta does not create, control and direct, stands in opposition to him. But the case of the world is different. The existence, etc., of the world are dependent upon *Īśvara* (because He gives them to the world, maintains them and destroys them as He wills). How can then the world be opposed to Him? Further, if the existence, etc., of the world were not dependent on Him, the world would be a rival to Him. It is not so. (Existence, etc., are certainly dependent upon Him and therefore the world is not a rival to Him.) These ideas clearly show that *Īśvara* is not merely a controller or director of the world, just as a king controls or directs his kingdom, but He is the giver of the very *sattā*, etc., to the world. This is the significance of His immanence (*antaryāmitva*) in the world.”³¹

N. S. 330, after stating an objection, applies the same idea both to the things that are said to be *nitya* and to the things that are said to be *anitya*: “An objection may be raised. The existence, etc., of the *nitya* things are *nitya*. That which is *nitya* cannot therefore be *paratantra*. This objection is met as follows: Just as *Īśvara* controls and directs *anitya* things by giving them existence, etc., being Himself *nitya*, He controls and directs the *nitya* entities continuously and incessantly by giving them existence, etc. Objects like a jar, for example, are of *anitya* nature. That they are *anitya* is not an accident. If they were an accident, they would have been destroyed

immediately after their production. (But they are not destroyed. After production they are maintained for some time and only afterwards, they are destroyed. At the time when they are maintained, they are as good as *nitya* things. That they are produced does not affect this aspect, viz., the aspect of their existence during the period when they are maintained. And to hold that they are dependent, *paratantra*, at the time when they are maintained, does not create any difficulty.) Similarly, there is no difficulty in holding that the *nityatva* of *nitya* things is *paratantra*. Further, because the *anityatva* of *anitya* things is *paratantra*, it does not follow that objects like a jar are *nitya*. Similarly, to hold that *nitya* things are *paratantra* does not make them *anitya*. (They may be *nitya*; but as *nitya*, they are *paratantra* in the sense that their reality is derived from Īśvara.) This simply means that it is His desire to maintain *nitya* things as *nitya* and *anitya* things as *anitya*. (Therefore that the world is *paratantra*, i.e., that it has derived reality, does not confuse *nitya* and *anitya* things.)"³²

The ideas that Brahman is the cause of the world and that the world is a product must not be understood from the commonsense point of view that a product has necessarily a beginning in time. The point of view of *Brahmavāda* is entirely different. It holds, as already noted, that a product may be *anādi* or *sādi*, *nitya* or *anitya* but it is more concerned with the finding out of the Ground or Basis of the whole world, recognizing the world as it is given, i.e., as consisting of enduring and non-enduring elements. This is what is meant by offering an explanation of *nitya* as *nitya* and *anitya* as *anitya*. That which explains them is their cause, Ground or Basis, i.e., Brahman. The *nitya* and *anitya* things are not self-explanatory because they are changing and limited (*vikāri* and *vibhakta*).

5. Svatantra, the Only Aim of Sound Thinking

To ignore this truth and to hold that something of the world is the cause of all or one of the causes of all is to overlook the changing and limited character of all that is the world. This error presupposes an undue interest in something that is of the world and a natural dislike for the ultimate source of all. Madhva calls this undue interest *durāgraha* and the dislike *paratattva vidveṣa*. In the presence of these defects, thinkers ignore the *Svatantra* character of the Creator and deny or modify His creative power. For example, *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* holds that the so-called Īśvara is only one among the many causes of the world and that he himself, i.e., without the help of other things, cannot create the *svarūpa* or *svabhāva* of anything. Thus *durāgraha* and *paratattva vidveṣa*, and not impartial enquiry, are the causes for the appearance of systems other than *Brahmavāda*. In addition to this

circumstance as Madhva notes, there are people who know only that much on the basis of which they entertain wrong ideas of Brahman. He calls them *alpavedins*. Further, people are influenced by those whom he calls *kupanditas* (sophisticated people). Making use of time-honoured terms in their own interest, such persons popularize their own ignorance about truth. This circumstance he calls *mithyājñānaprasakti* (spreading of wrong knowledge). Further, people are in general interested in things that are *tāmasa* (evil) in nature. All these circumstances are also the creation of Īśvara and they have also a purpose to serve. If a person were to transcend these evil influences, he must be naturally endowed with pure intellect (*śuddha buddhi*). Even this is a creation of Īśvara's wish and Madhva calls it *Īśvaraprasāda*.³³

In stating these ideas Madhva does not condemn the world as evil because his is the spirit of seeing Brahman even in the so-called evil things. He only indicates the abilities required really to appreciate the truth that Brahman is the Ground of all. Even though we seem to be quite free from these defects and are deeply interested in understanding what really Madhva has taught, we may not in reality be free from the defects and may not be following his actual teaching. Sometimes, we may read carelessly some passages of Madhva such as:—the world is *satya*, *nitya*, etc., it is different from Brahman, Brahman creates the world making use of *prakṛti*, etc.; Brahman is *tattva*; the world is *rattva*, etc., etc. And after such a careless reading, we may wrongly think that Madhva teaches as follows:—World is as real as Brahman. Brahman is one of the causes of the world; Brahman has therefore a second or many seconds to it, etc., etc. We may even think that we can support these ideas by means of *Śruti*, *Smṛti* and the arguments used by the other Darśanas, *Nyāya*, and so on. But all these are only notions that are fundamentally opposed to Madhva's *Brahmavāda*, the sole aim of which is to establish *Svatantra* as the only ground of the world. The passages cited above which seem to mislead us have a deeper significance if we take them in their context. So in describing the general circumstance of the world Madhva gives us a caution so that we may be better able to maintain *śuddha buddhi* transcending at the same time the evil influence of lower passions, *durāgraha*, etc.

In reflecting on *prakṛtivāda* of Sāṅkhya, i.e., the theory that *prakṛti* is the origin of all, Madhva notes that it is undue interest in *prakṛti* that is the source of this theory. This interest is called *pradhānadurdīkṣa*. He does not make any difference in substance between *pradhānavāda* and *māyāvāda* because both imply the denial of Brahman, the only source of all.³⁴ Nor can *pradhāna* or *māyā* by itself be the cause of the world. The *pradhāna* of Sāṅkhya is limited by *puruṣa* and *māyā* of Śankara is limited by *Nirguṇa Brahman*.

All these considerations show with what care and accuracy Madhva is establishing his *Brahmavāda*. He demands the same care and accuracy from his readers also. To emphasise this aspect is, after all, not out of place. Being misled by the term *dvaita* that is applied to Madhva's thought even an ardent follower of Madhva may try to find out dualism or pluralism in his thought. Whatever be the name given to his thought, in fairness to him, one ought to start from his actual teaching, but never from the popular and sometimes misleading name given to it. In every work of his, in the beginning, middle and in the end, Madhva asserts at the cost of much repetition that the sole aim of his philosophy is to establish that Brahman is the *Svatantra* cause of all. At every stage of his thought he amplifies in unambiguous language the teaching of *Śruti*—"Ekamevadviṭīyam Brahma"—(Brahman is one only and It is second-less) by his favourite expression that Hari is *Sarvottama*—the highest Principle of all. To make use of English terms, his system is unmodified monism in the sense that it traces everything absolutely to one principle, *i.e.*, Brahman. It is thus far from dualism or pluralism. Further, to call his thought monotheism is not to do justice to him. Monotheism implies something of religious faith. But mere faith as opposed to reason has no place in his philosophy. He accepts only that as real which is in every sense revealed by *pramāṇa* the truth of which is well established. His conceptions are without exception rationalistic. When he quotes *Śruti* or *Smṛti* his aim is not to gain strength from it, but to indicate the philosophy underlying the text. With him the items of the world may be many. They may be real or actual in so far as they go. But they are all without exception the work, expression or creation of one single Principle, *i.e.*, *Svatantra*, Brahman. Madhva says that this is the real teaching of *Śruti*, "*Sa idam sarvamasṛjata*". (He created all this.) The same truth is further amplified in the following pages.

A superficial reading of *Purāṇas* often makes us familiar with the creation of the world in cycles (*kalpa*). We are told that *Īśvara* gives rise to the things of the world, *mahat*, *ahankāra*, etc., making use of *prakṛti* as *upādāna* and *kāla*, etc., as *nimitta*, in accordance with the *karma* of the *jīvas* that have to play their parts in the created world. This is the popular idea of creation among the Hindus in general and the *mādhvas* is particular. It is popularly believed that the *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes of the world and the *jīvas* are *anādi* and therefore uncreated. It is also believed that God is the creator in the sense that he connects and directs the several self-existent *anādi* things and with their help creates the objects of the world, even as a pot-maker connects water, clay, etc., and makes a pot. The idea that the *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes of the world exist irrespective of God, the creator, is the substance of this belief. In spite of the Vedic teaching and *Brahmavāda* founded on it,

this belief has somehow become a tradition. This tradition seems to be the result of an undigested mixture of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *Sāṅkhya* and *Pūrva-mīmāṃsa*. Most often, it seems to appeal to common sense because people at large are generally unable to comprehend how *anādi* things can be created even by *Īśvara*. This circumstance is given a colour by the term *dvaita* which is commonly taken to mean that there is a second to Brahman, namely *anādi*. This *anādi* thing may even be dependent on Brahman just in the sense that a servant is dependent on his master, but it is self-existent even as Brahman is. Whatever be the value of this belief, Madhva's *Brahmavāda* gives absolutely no support for this belief. The author of *T. C.* seems to laugh at this belief when he says on p. 389, "If the teaching of *Śruti* 'He created all this' is taken to mean that He created only the products that have a beginning in time, i.e., the products that are *sādi*, then consistently with this idea another *Śruti* passage 'He transcends all this, etc.' also ought to be taken to mean that He transcends only the world of products (*sādi*), but not the things of the world that are said to be *anādi* and *nitya*."³⁵ The idea is that to limit the meaning of the term all (*sarva* or *viśva*) in these passages can never be justified. The teaching of these passages is that *Īśvara* is the creator of all—both *sādi* and *anādi*, He therefore transcends all and for this reason He is *Svatantra*.✕

6. *Svatantra, the Sole Creator of All, Always, Everywhere*

The truth that Brahman is the cause of all does not imply that the objects It creates continue to exist and operate independent of It. Brahman is also the cause of the maintenance of existence and operation. Objects of the world operate in different manners under a given circumstance. Certain things act as causes. Certain other things appear as products and the remaining things seem to be indifferent. Causeness, productness and indifference are different operations of the objects. They are equally the creation of Brahman and they are therefore products. We have seen how the rich creatorship of *Īśvara* can make, unmake and differently make things. Applying this thought to the case of these three entities, cause, product and indifferent entities, it is easy to see how *Īśvara* can cancel all or make each the other. He might have cancelled a different product and produced the product in question. Or, He could have made the present product its cause or an indifferent entity and made the cause or indifferent entity the present product. Further even with regard to time in which a product is supposed to appear, He could have made the present past or future and the past or future the present. He could have even made the present pastless or futureless and the product causeless or effectless. We are thus required to see His *kāraṇa*, *akāraṇa* and *anyathākāraṇa*—doing, undoing and doing differently

with reference to every item of the world. So the fact that He has created a product is purely an expression of His independent will and it only illustrates the final truth taught by the Upaniṣad, 'Icchāmātram prabhoḥ sṛṣṭiḥ'. The circumstance under which alone a thing seems to be produced does not therefore offer any serious difficulty with reference to *Brahmavāda*. And in fact, it amplifies the *Svatantra* character of Brahman. Further, if the purāṇas mean that Īśvara really needed the assistance of *prakṛti*, etc., they are wrong, because they are sublated by *Brahmavāda*. If they can be interpreted so as to amplify the richness of Īśvara's creatorship, then only they are respected. One who is engaged in *Brahmajijnāsā* can never dispense with these truths.

The inevitable conclusion from the previous considerations is that the creation of the world or the creative activity of Īśvara cannot be confined to any one period or periods. Īśvara's creation is going on incessantly and unceasingly everywhere without exception and with reference to everything in the world including even the things that may be looked upon as being already created. There is nothing in the world that does not undergo change. Everything however stable it may seem to be, is really undergoing deep changes incessantly. Take the case of a *cetana*; change in the body or in mind and change even in the duration of its existence speak of the incessant change that occurs to *cetana*. Similar is the consideration with regard to *acetana*. Change is the very essence of the reality of the world. Nothing is thus self-same as it is ordinarily taken to be. The authorship of this universal change speaks for the incessant creative activity of Īśvara. So the *Gītā* says, "I am the giver of all *bhāvas* to the creatures".

In following this discussion, we must bear in mind that according to Madhva the so-called substance and its property are not different from each other. So, to speak of a change as occurring to something is to represent the real or actual essence (*svarūpa*) of the thing itself. This position enables him to explain how even the so-called *nitya* things, *prakṛti* and so on, are incessantly created in having incessant changes. This explains how from the standpoint of Īśvara's creatorship, there is no significant distinction between *nitya* and *anitya* things.

Change comes from Īśvara. It is therefore *parādhīna*. The state of a thing obtaining *parādhīna* is called *parādhīna-viśeṣāvāpti*. *Parādhīna-viśeṣa* means a variety of *parādhīna*. *Avāpti* means obtainment. This is the meaning of *sṛṣṭi* (creation). It applies to all that is other than Brahman. It is called by Madhva *parādhīnatva* or *tadvaśatā*. It is not a mere occurrence to an enduring entity, but it is the mark of the creation of the entity

itself. Change and changing entity are thus one and the same thing. This means that both form a single entity which is called *viśiṣṭa*. With reference to a *viśiṣṭa* two aspects may be distinguished—attributive (*dharma* or *viśeṣaṇa*) and substantive (*dharmī* or *viśeṣya*). This distinction is made on the basis of *viśeṣa* (peculiarity or uniqueness) which is found in everything we think of. Without it nothing can be thought of. For the reason that everything conceived has its own *viśeṣa*, a single entity, i.e., *viśiṣṭa* is treated as though it consists of two aspects, *dharma* and *dharmī*. This explains how nothing in the world can be *nirviśeṣa* and nothing is really different from its property.

N. S. 431 says, "The production of a property of a thing means the production of the *viśiṣṭa*. *Viśiṣṭa* is identical with *svārūpa* of the thing. The production of a *viśiṣṭa* means the production of *svārūpa* of the thing."³⁶ To illustrate this point the production of a *jīva* may be taken for example. Whenever a *jīva* has a relation to something external such as body or has even an idea in its mind, it has the production of its *svārūpa* itself. An idea in the mind or relation to a body is a case of change that occurs to *jīva*. With this change *jīva* becomes a *viśiṣṭa*. This *viśiṣṭa* is not different from the essence or *svārūpa* of *jīva*. So the production of change means the production of *svārūpa* (*svārūpa sṛṣṭi*) of *jīva*. Change is *parādhīnaviśeṣa* and its occurrence to *jīva* is *parādhīna-viśeṣāvāpti*. T. Pr. 2.3.18 says, "*Jīva's* production in this sense is not metaphorical, but it is a real case of production."³⁷ This is the implication of the *Sadasatkāryavāda* of Madhva according to which nothing is permanent and nothing is devoid of *pūrvāvasthā* and *uttarāvasthā*, i.e., nothing has a first beginning in time. It is true that we are not commonly familiar with this meaning of production. We commonly believe that production of a thing is a fresh beginning of a product in time. This belief is perhaps the influence of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's* *Asatkāryavāda*, non-existent-product-theory. This theory is not true to experience, because it does not explain how something comes only from a particular thing. We have seen that oil comes only from the oil-seeds, but not from sand. By way of appreciating the significance of this experience *Sāṅkhya* holds *Satkāryavāda*, existent-product-theory. According to this theory a product is existent even before the so-called production of it, just as oil exists in oil-seed before it is produced. So *Sāṅkhya* concludes that the so-called production consists in making patent (*vyakta*) what is latent (*avyakta*). But he does not somehow see that this making patent is itself a fresh change brought upon the thing. So Madhva favours *sada-satkāryavāda*. This is the theory that holds that a product is existent only as a *pūrvāvasthā* and non-existent as product, i.e., as an expression of a

fresh change. This is what Madhva means by *parādhīnaviśeṣāvāpti* and it is in this very sense that he holds that *Īśvara* creates the world incessantly. *N. S.* 327 says, "Therefore the doership in the real sense belongs only to Him."³⁸ This implies that nothing in the world can be said to do anything in the real sense of the term. *Acetana* does not do anything. The case of *cetana* also is in reality the same. Taking for example a case where a *jīva* seems to do something, *N. S.* 327 says, "Both *jīva* and *Īśvara* are in the body—(*jīva* as *abhimānin* and *Īśvara* as *antaryāmin*). He (*Īśvara*) produces knowledge, desire and will of the *jīva* by means of His knowledge, desire and will. He also gives the power of causeness to the other causes which are external to *jīva*. Thus He produces jar, etc. The so-called doership of *jīva* is thus given by Him. The same is the implication of the teaching of the *Gītā*—'knowledge, discrimination, etc., come from me'.³⁹

This illustration explains how rich *Īśvara's* creatorship is. In creating even an ordinary thing⁴⁰ like a jar, one can note the real extent of His rich creatorship. His knowing the abilities of *antaḥkaraṇa* is to give those abilities to *antaḥkaraṇa*. This is to create both the abilities and the *antaḥkaraṇa* as having them. *Antaḥkaraṇa* is thus a *viśiṣṭa*. To give this *viśiṣṭa* to *jīva* is to create *jīva* as a *viśiṣṭa*. Under the same circumstance the knowledge, desire and will of the *jīva* are created. With them the *jīva* becomes a more complex *viśiṣṭa*. Some external entities such as implements, etc., as having causeness are also created. As a result of all these productions, the production of a jar takes place. Further, the production of the jar in this manner directly or indirectly moulds the circumstances of the whole world. This implies that the whole world is created with this special circumstance. (Similar ideas are not new to modern scientific thinking.) Further according to the Vedic tradition every aspect of the world is presided by a controlling principle or agent (*abhimānin*). There are good and bad elements in the world. And there are corresponding good and bad principles—*Devas* and *Dāityas*. The latter are finally brought down by the former. The former are therefore good and superior. *Vāyu* is the highest of them. He controls knowledge, life and strength. He is therefore called *jīvottama*. *Śrī* or *Lakṣmī* is still higher. She is the controller of all *cetana* and *acetana*. The production of the things of the world is an expression of the operation of these agents. This means that when a thing is produced all the agents with their special operation are created. *N. S.* 280 says, "*Abhimānī* is that which is the condition (*prayojaka*) of the reality of the thing in question."⁴⁰ The *abhimānins* are thus the lower principles of the world. *Īśvara* is the highest of all. He is the principle of principles. He creates things with all the principles. This

is the richness of His creatorship. This does not mean that He creates things through the agency of the other principles. It only means that their agency also is created. This implies that they are themselves created as *Viśiṣṭa* with their special agency. For this reason they are called only *nimitta* or *dvārā* in the creation of things. This explains how *Īśvara* is the direct or immediate cause (*sākṣātkāraṇa*) of all that exists. Madhva says in *Anu. Vy.* 1. 1. 6, "The direct and immediate cause of all is *Nārāyaṇa* (*guṇapūrṇa* and *nirdoṣa*). He is Brahman. This is the teaching of the whole *Śruti*. The aim of this *Śāstra* is to establish this Truth."⁴¹ In the light of these ideas, it is easy to see how the production of a change means the production of the whole world, i.e., *Brahmāṇḍa*. From *Śrī* downwards everything is affected in some way or other whenever and wherever a change takes place in the world. Thus the creation of a change means the creation of all. These ideas illustrate well how the whole world being nothing but change and limitation is *paratantra* and how Brahman, the Ground of all, is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*.

In the foregoing discussions some sort of doership is attributed to *jīva*. This does not in any sense modify the doership of *Īśvara* and in fact it amplifies *Īśvara's* doership. *N. S.* 305 says, "[In giving doership (*kartṛtvā*) to a *cetana*, this is what *Īśvara* does.] Having been the author (*Niyāmaka*) of the particular *svarūpa* and *svabhāva*, of the *cetana*, having made *caitanya* the basis, having made *viśeṣa* the means, having introduced many items of identity (*abheda*) though they are opposed to one another and having given power to *cetana* that is consistent with the production of the thing in question, *Īśvara* makes the things produced by the *jīva*. . . Such is the power of *Īśvara* which is nowhere else observed. He is Omnipotence itself (*Aśeṣaśakti*) and His doership knows nothing impossible."⁴² This illustrates how the so-called doership of *jīva* can in no sense be compared to the doership of *Īśvara*. Both are called doership because of the poverty of language. This circumstance is to make use of *Samākarṣanyāya*. This *nyāya* means actual borrowing of words that are primarily applied to *Īśvara* and then applying them to the things of the world in a much inferior secondary sense. In fact, the doership of *jīva* illustrates its changing character and thereby proves how its *svarūpa* is constantly created. But the doership of *Īśvara* illustrates His *aśeṣaśakti* and amplifies His *Svātantrya* and *Guṇapūrṇatva*.

A question may be asked, If *Īśvara* has *aśeṣaśakti*, why has He created this imperfect world? This question does not arise, because the philosophical enquiry concerns itself with the world that is given and not with what ought to be given. Even assuming that the question does arise, this question implies that what is created must be as perfect as the Creator. In that case,

the created is either different from *Īśvara* or not different from *Īśvara*. If it is different, it cannot be perfect, because perfection implies absence of limit and thus there cannot be two perfect entities. If it is not different, it is identical with *Īśvara* and then the distinction between the created and the Creator is not justified. Either way, the question is not justified. But it does not follow that the creative power of Brahman is in any sense modified. Madhva holds, however, that in creating a thing, *Īśvara* takes a form that is immanent in that thing. *Īśvara* has thus *Anantarūpa*. Each form is *Īśvara* Himself, in the sense that each is the self-identical expression of *Īśvara*. Because He is *Svatantra*, the difference between the created and the creator does not apply to this form of creation. *Śruti* says, "In Brahman there is no difference of any sort." (*Neha nānāsti kincana*.) Thus *Īśvara* creating Himself along with the creation of the world is an aspect of His creation and this is an expression of His *paramaiśvarya*. Madhva says, *Tai. Bh.* 5, "Thus willed *Īśvara*: let me take many forms." (*Bahurūpo bhavanītiacintayāt*.)

Thus the fact that the world is limited implies the all-completeness of its Ground, i.e., Brahman. This conception would be impossible if the several items of the world could be confused and could not be arranged in a definite order. Confusion and disorder mean that nothing can be fixed. The fact of this very statement and the conception behind it imply order and law in the world. Consistently with this truth and with a view to amplify it, Madhva speaks of *tāratamya*, gradation of higher and lower realities according to the nature of existence, knowledge and function of the things. After fixing them in the scale of gradation, he shows that they can never be confused. He amplifies this idea by his conception of *pancabheda*—fivefold difference, namely the everlasting difference between one *cetana* and another *cetana*, one *acetana* and another *acetana*, *cetana* and *acetana*, *cetana* and *Īśvara* and *acetana* and *Īśvara*. The one aim of Madhva in studying all this is the establishment of *Svatantra* so as to prove the further richness of Its creative power and all-completeness.

Madhva explains in this connection how the world has a definite programme, a definite purpose and a definite order. Nothing is confused in the world. Even the so-called confusion of things from the standpoint of ordinary beings has to help a definite order of the universe. Even the imperfection or dark side of the world helps the expression of the bright side of the same. This shows how the things are created on a principle. Imperfection leads to perfection. Errors lead to correction and bondage leads to release. The previous stages of things help the expression of the later developments of the same.

Madhva brings in this connection the conception of *karma*. *Karma* is an expression of the disposition of the individuals based on their own doings. This means that *Īśvara* brings out fresh changes in the world consistently with the *karma* of the individuals that are to enjoy the creation of the fresh changes. He does not give individuals what is not due to them. And he never fails to give them what is really due to them in accordance with their own *Karma*. For this reason He is called *Sama*, equal to all. This means that He has no partiality (*vaiṣamya*) and unkindness (*nairghṛṇya*). He does not do things indiscriminately. But this does not mean that He is bound by certain principles. The so-called principles of the world are only the expressions of His perfection and they do not therefore bind Him. That He fashions things according to the *karma* of the individuals does not mean that He is bound by *karma*, because *karma* is after all His creation. He desired law and order in the world. *Karma* appeared. So the world with all its order is the creation of His free desire.

The fact that He wished higher and lower beings does not mean that He is affected by the defects—*vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya*. *N. S.* 311 says, "With a view to free *Īśvara* from *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya*, it is so far said that *Īśvara* creates things according to the *karma* of the *jīvas*. But this means that His creation is not the result of His free desire as he wants the help of *karma*. (How then can He be *Svatantra*? This is the answer.) Though He creates things of course according to *karma*, still His *Svātantrya* is justified. It is already established that He gives *sattā*, etc., to *karma* and so on. To make use of something to which He Himself has given *sattā*, etc., does not affect His *Svātantrya*. An objection may be raised:—So in His case to make use of *Karma* is as good as not making use of it and this means that He can never be free from *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya*. This is the answer: *Pramāṇas* establish that *Īśvara* has *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya*. To attribute them to Him is not therefore wrong. Further *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya* are not by themselves defects. They are defects only when they originate from defects and lead to defects. They cause evil in *jīva*. But they do not cause evil in *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* is free from evil. For this reason the author of the *Sūtra* attributes them to *Īśvara* and the author of the *Bhāṣya* supports it."⁴³ The idea is that *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya* are some of the essential aspects of *Svātantrya*. Even in the world one cannot be said to be *svatantra* without having *vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya* in some sense or the other.

7. Svatantra, the Transcendent

So far, the conception that *Īśvara* is the sole Creator of all is explained. In this connection the richness of His creatorship is indicated. How the

richness of His creatorship leads to the conception of His *Guṇapūrṇatva* is also noted. In recognition of all these truths Madhva calls *Īśvara acintya* (inconceivable) and *adbhuta* (wonderful). These are the expressions of His transcendent (*alaukika*) nature. *Śruti* illustrates His transcendence in such passages as "He is smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest." Human reason does not of course comprehend this truth. But this does not mean that this truth is meaningless. It is consistent with the *Svatantra* nature of Brahman. It is therefore an expression of *Svatantra* and it is self-established.

The fact that *Svatantra* is the source of the very reality of *paratantra* implies that It is immanent in the latter. Whatever is *paratantra* is a production of *Svatantra*. In order to signify this idea *Śruti* makes use of various terms such as *pratibimba* (reflection), *ābhāsa* (appearance), *chāyā* (image), etc. Corresponding to these terms *Svatantra* is called *Bimba* (the source of reflection). Because the terms reflection, etc., are sometimes applied to unreal or illusory things by people, it must not be supposed that what is created is unreal or illusory. Much energy may be wasted to prove the correctness of this supposition but the supposition leads nowhere. It neither justifies life in the world, nor philosophy nor Brahman as the ground of all. If everything is denied, the fact of denial at least is asserted and this fact at least needs an explanation. And *Svatantra* alone can be this explanation. This is how *Svatantra* is ever self-established. To hold that the denial of all implies the denial of even the fact of denial is only a clever way of explaining away the point at issue and it cannot be respected in a sound philosophy. So, on no basis can the actuality or the reality of *paratantra* be considered to be unreal or illusory and the self-established nature of *Svatantra* be denied.

Sometimes in place of *pratibimba* the terms like *sadṛśa*, *sarūpa* and *aṁśa* are used. These terms are commonly taken to mean similarity or part. On the basis of this commonsense meaning, it must not be supposed that *Svatantra* is similar to *paratantra* or *paratantra* is a part of *Svatantra*. For *Svatantra* is transcendent and it cannot be similar to *paratantra*. Further, *Svatantra* is devoid of difference within Itself and It has no parts. So the terms *sadṛśa*, etc., as applied to *paratantra* or *pratibimba*, mean that its reality is derived from *Svatantra*.

Of the two entities *acetana* and *cetana* that constitute the world, *acetana* has mere *sattā* and it is a *pratibimba* of the *sattā* aspect of *Svatantra*. *Cetana* has in addition *jñāna* and *ānanda*. It is therefore a *pratibimba* of *sattā*, *jñāna* and *ānanda* of *Svatantra*. *Jīva* in this sense is called *ābhāsa* of *Īśvara*,

Anu. V. 3. 2. 42 says, “*Jīva* is called *ābhāsa* because its knowledge and existence are always produced by *Īśvara*. Just as a man’s shadow is a reflection and a creation of the man all the *jīvas*, *caturmukha*, etc., are *prati-bimbās* of *paramātmān*. They are incomplete and Hari alone is all-complete.”⁴⁴ *Anu. V. 4. 1. 65*, says, “The entity denoted by the term *Ātman* is therefore only *Viṣṇu* and none else. Because the other entities are not *Guṇapūrṇa*, the terms *Ātmā*, *Brahma*, etc., do not mean anything, other than *Viṣṇu*.”⁴⁵ So a *jīva*’s reality is only derived. *Jīva* is therefore *ātmābhāsa* but not *Ātman*. *Ātman* is only *Viṣṇu*. Therefore the belief that Madhva holds *Ātmanānātvavāda*, namely, the doctrine that there are many *ātmans*, does not represent the spirit of his teaching. His position alone brings out the real significance of the doctrine of One *Ātman* (*Āikātmīya Vāda*) taught by the *Upaniṣads*, because it accounts for the actual existence of *jīvas*.

By holding that *Svatantra* alone is *Ātman*, Madhva brings out the complete identical character of *Svatantra*. To note this point is essential, because the truth that *Svatantra* is *Guṇapūrṇa* may be carelessly taken to mean that each of the *guṇas* that constitute *Svatantra* represents only a part of *Svatantra*. It may be further concluded, in spite of Madhva’s teaching that *Svatantra* is completely devoid of distinction within Itself, that each *guṇa* is essentially different from the others. In explaining the complete oneness of *Svatantra* Madhva says in *Anu. V. 3. 2. 16*, “The *guṇas* of *Īśvara* transcend all. All His *guṇas* are all His other *guṇas*. All are the creators of all. All are all-complete.... The identity of them is *Vāsudeva*. He is completely defectless.”⁴⁶ This is the conception of *Guṇapūrṇa*.

Having established that *Īśvara* as *guṇapūrṇa* is all transcendent, Madhva speaks of His *bheda* (distinction) from the world. The word *bheda* in this connection signifies the highly distinguished nature of *Īśvara*, namely His complete transcendence. To modify *bheda* in any manner is to lower down *Īśvara* and to deny His *Svātantrīya*, for *asvatantra* is defective and *svatantra* is defectless and the two can never be identical. *Anu. V. 3. 2. 42* says, “As implied by *Śruti*, *Svatantra* is so far well conceived. It is not confused with *asvatantra*. All the attributes given to *Svatantra* are justified, because they are implied in the conception of *Svatantra*. These attributes cannot be justified, if they are applied to *asvatantra*. Any attribute that is inconsistent with *Svatantra* must not be applied to It, for that which is opposed to *Svatantra* is itself wrong. All aspects of our experience must be interpreted consistently with *Svatantra*.”⁴⁷ *Svatantra* is thus ever distinct from *asvatantra*. *Anu. V. 3. 3. 39* says, “*Svatantra* is distinguished from *asvatantra* in order to prove Its defectlessness (*nirdoṣatva*).”⁴⁸ Thus Madhva speaks of *bheda* just to define *Svatantra* clearly.

8. Svatantra, the Real of the Reals

Just as Madhva employs the conception of *bheda* to prove the *nirdoṣatva* of *Īśvara*, he employs the conception of the reality (*satyatva*) of the world to justify the creatorship of *Īśvara*. If the world is not real, the creatorship of *Īśvara* cannot be justified. The conception of a creator of nothing involves self-contradiction and the denial of the reality of the world ends in the denial of its cause, i.e., Brahman. *N. S.* 210 says, "It is wrong to think that to hold the world is real does not lead to any good (*puruṣārtha*), for the reality of the world justifies the creatorship of *Īśvara*. Through this, His *guṇapūrṇatva* or *māhātmya* is conceived and this leads to *puruṣārtha*".⁴⁹ The reality of the world can be justified from the standpoint of Brahman also. Because Brahman is *Guṇapūrṇa* and *nirdoṣa*, His creation must be necessarily real. But the *satyatva* of the world is never confused with the *satyatva* of Brahman. Because the world is *satya*, it is never taken to be a second to Brahman. It is never equal to Brahman in any sense of the term. Brahman is *Paramārtha* in the sense that It gives reality to all. For this reason, Brahman is *Advaita* or *Advitīya*, secondless and superiorless. This is the teaching of *Śruti*: *Advaitam paramārthataḥ, Advaitaḥ sarva bhāvānām*, etc.

Further, to call the world *satya* proves the *paratantra* character of the world. The world is *satya* because it has *satva* from Brahman. As the giver of *satva* to the world, Brahman is *satya*. *Anu. V. 1. 1. 6* says, "Brahman is *satya* because It gives *satva* to the world. This is the meaning of *sṛṣṭi* (creation)".⁵⁰ In interpreting this passage, *N. S.* 134, says, "*Sat* means *sadbhāva*. This means birth. Because Brahman gives this to everything other than Itself. It is called *Satya*.... Living or existing is also a meaning of *satva*.... Destruction is also a meaning of the same. Because Brahman gives living and destruction also to the world, It is called *Satya*".⁵¹ The world, having *satva* in these senses, is necessarily a changing entity (*vikāri*) and is therefore a product (*kārya*). This means that it has a cause. That cause must be changeless (*Nirvikāra*) and is therefore *Svatantra*. This is how the conception of *satyatva* of the world helps the conception of *Svatantra* as its Ground.

Such a conception of *satyatva* of the world also leads to various other conceptions of the world that establish the truth of *Svāntantrya*. *Bhg. T.* 139 says, "The world does not continue to be the same. It changes. For this reason, it is said to be *anṛta*, though it is real. Because Brahman is always changeless, It is always *Satya*".⁵² *N. Mr.* 289 says, "In some passages of the scriptures, the world is said to be *asat*, because it is *asādhu*

and *asvatantra*; *apāramāṛthika*, because it changes and is destroyed; *mithyā*, because it is useless (*vr̥thā*); *avidyamāna*, because it does not continue to be in relation to *jīva*; and *māyāmaya*, because it is an expression of *prakṛti*. The world is compared to a dream, etc., because it is *anitya*, *vikāri* and *paratantra*, and never because it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman."⁵³ So, according to Madhva, the world as *satya* is *paratantra*. This speaks for the transcendence or *Svātantrya* of Brahman.

9. Svatantra, the Only Reality

Anu. V. 3. 8. 39 says, "The *guṇas*, *satya*, etc., form the very essence of this highest *Īśvara*."⁵⁴ Consistently with this idea, *Bhg. T.* 138 says, "He alone is *Satya*. *Satyatva* means *Svātantrya*. That is *Viṣṇu*. The *satyatva* of other things is their being always in changing process. Such is always the being of *puruṣa* (*jīva*) and *prakṛti*."⁵⁵ The being of *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in this connection is their being in space and time. *Viṣṇu* is *Satya* in the sense that He is the very Ground of all this—space, time, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This means that He alone is *nitya*. *Satya* and *Nitya* connote the same idea. *N. S.* 225 says, "*Satya* is interpreted as *sadātana* (existing always). *Satya* and *nitya* therefore mean the same thing."⁵⁶ This passage implies that nothing else can be *satya* or *nitya* in the primary sense of these terms. *N. S.* 200 says, "To say that *prāṇa*, etc. (world) are *satya* implies that they are *adhīna*."⁵⁷ In this sense, *Śruti* says, Brahman is *satya* of *satya* (*satyasyasatyam*). In this expression, the second *satya* means *adhīna*. *N. Mr.* 292 says, "The *satyatva* of the world, i.e., *prāṇa*, etc., is inferior (*apakṛṣṭa*)."⁵⁸ The *Sūtra* calls the world *avara* (inferior). It is inferior because it is *adhīna* and *adhīna* means derived. So the *satyatva* or *nityatva* of the world is only derived. It is *avara*, *apakṛṣṭa* or *adhīna*. But the *satyatva* or *nityatva* of Brahman is *Svatantra*. So the difference between the two cases of *satyatva* or *nityatva* is one of kind and not of degree. One can never be compared with the other. In fact, the *satyatva* of the world can never be expressed along with the *Satyatva* of Brahman. *N. S.* 188 says, "Therefore it is established that to mention anything along with *Īśvara* (as similar to *Īśvara*) is prohibited."⁵⁹

If the statements "Brahman is *satya*" and "world is *satya*" occur anywhere in Madhva's works, his intention is to prove or illustrate one by the other as follows:—The world is *satya*, because Brahman is *Satya*, i.e., Brahman gives *satyatva* to the world. Brahman is *Satya*, because the world is *satya*, i.e., *satyatva* of the world points to Brahman as its Ground. It is evident that to take the *satyatva* of both as similar is sublated by the very foundations of this system, viz., *Brahmavāda*. If Śāṅkara says that the

world is *mithyā* because it is *bādhya* (sublated), Madhva points out that the world is not *bādhya* because it is given by *pramāṇa*, even as Śankara's Brahman (*Nirguṇa*) is not *bādhya*. Madhva holds that the world is *satya* in the sense of *abādhya*, even as Śankara's Brahman is *satya* in the sense of *abādhya*. Thus he brings Śankara's highest Brahman, i.e., *Nirguṇa* down to the level of the world as he conceives. *N. Mr.* 95, makes use of this idea and says, "Let the world have *satva* (*satyatva*) that is similar to the *satva* (*satyatva*) of your (Śankara's) Brahman, i.e., *Nirguṇa* (supposing It to be real for the sake of argument)".⁶⁰

Madhva justifies the conception of *Svatantra* as the Highest Reality on the basis of a well-conceived scheme of degrees of reality of the world. He says in *Br. Bh.* 31, "That which has evil is *mūrta*. (That is the word below *Vāyu*.) *Virinca* (*Vāyu*) is the *rasa* (principle) of *mūrta*. He is free from evil (*Śrī* is the *rasa* of *Vāyu*. She is free from evil) because *Śrī* and *Vāyu* are free from evil, they are *amūrta*. *Viṣṇu* is not like *mūrta*, not like the *rasa* of *mūrta* and not like *amūrta*. He is therefore always under all circumstances the Highest. All else is inferior. He is therefore *Satya* of *satya*. He alone is the principle of *mūrta* and *amūrta*. Therefore He alone is *Satya*."⁶¹ According to this passage, the order of gradation of Reality is this—*mūrta*, *mūrtarasa* or *amūrta* and *Viṣṇu*. The latter ones are the principles of the former ones. *Viṣṇu* is the Highest of all. In holding that *Viṣṇu* alone is *Satya*, Madhva's idea is explained in *Bhg. T.* 138: "If He wills, then all this exists; otherwise, it does not exist. Therefore, under every circumstance and in every connection, the truth that He alone is real must be fully recognised."⁶²

From the standpoint that Brahman alone is real, Madhva says in *Bhg. T.* 125, "*Svātantrya* is *satva*. *Viṣṇu* alone has it and none else. *Bhg. T.* 135. . . . *Svatantra* is *vastu*; *paratantra* is *avastu*, i.e., not *vastu*. *Bh. T.* 125. *Svatantra* is *cetana*, *Viṣṇu* alone is *cetana*."⁶³ These expressions mean that from the standpoint of Brahman, the world is neither *sat* nor *vastu* and the so-called *cetana* is not *cetana*. Madhva says further, *Bhg. T.* 106, "*Svatantra* is *Paramārtha* (Absolute). Hari's desire is *svatantra*. Anything else is *paratantra*. It does not at all exist as *paramārtha*. . . . The real (*sat*) is the Independent (*Svādhīna*). The dependent is unreal. Therefore, the wise say that it does not exist. . . . Though the world exists from the beginningless to the endless time, because it is *asvatantra*, it must be said to be non-existent. The changeless *Viṣṇu* alone is *Paramārtha*, because He is *svatantra*. . . . If there is *dvaita* (illusion) about Him, it is His creation. He Himself removes it, if the conviction that *dvaita* is *adhīna* and He is *Svatantra* (occurs to *jīva*). Because *dvaita* is *adhīna*, it is said to be *nāsti*

(non-existing). This is the teaching of those that know Brahman and teach it."⁶⁴

This is how Madhva justifies the teaching of *Śruti*, "Brahman is one only and It is secondless" (*Ekamevādītīyam-Brahma*). He brings out the significance of this *Śruti*, by means of another *Śruti*, "All these different aspects of the world, *svabhāva*, *jīva*, *karma*, *dravya*, *kāla*, *Śruti* and *kriyā*, exist because of His will. And if He is indifferent, they do not exist."⁶⁵ It may be noted that all these entities also represent the world-principles according to other systems of thought like *Cārvaka*, etc. Madhva brings them all under the category of the world and makes them the creation of Brahman. Thus the only aim of his teaching is to establish the truth of Brahman, i.e., *Svatantra*. As he says in *Bhg. T.* 3, "*Paramātman* alone is *Tattva*. Therefore the wise see Him only."⁶⁶

10. *Svatantra, the All*

We have seen how creation means giving *sattā*, etc., to the created. This meaning of creation enables Madhva to explain the passages of *Śruti* which apparently teach the identity of Brahman and the world. He says, *Bhg. T.* 17, "All this, viz., the world consisting of *bheda* is said to be *puruṣa* Himself, because the *sattā*, etc., of the world are *adhīna*."⁶⁷ *Bhg. T.* 53, "Because Hari gives *sattā* to all, He is called *Sarvatattva*."⁶⁸ *Bhg. T.* 55, "Because Keśava gives *sattā* to *jīva*, He is said to be identical with it."⁶⁹ *Tai. Bh.* 9, "All this is He, because He is the Giver of all this."⁷⁰ *V.T.V.*, "All this is called Brahman, because *sattā*, etc., of this are *Brahmādhīna*."⁷¹ The following is what Madhva means by these passages:—On the strength of the apparent meaning of certain Vedic passages, to hold that there is complete identity between the world and Brahman is to confuse one with the other. This results in the denial of both. *Paratantra* as being identified with *Svatantra* is unreal, because it ceases to be *paratantra*. Similarly, *Svatantra* as being identified with *paratantra* is unreal, because it ceases to be *Svatantra*. Therefore, we must abandon the apparent meaning of *Śruti*, and study the implication of the *abheda* or identity taught by it. This implication consists only in recognizing the fact that Brahman is the Giver of reality to the world. Thus Madhva explains *abheda* by employing the same conceptions, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*, that point out *bheda* between the two. *Bheda* according to him is thus an expression of *abheda* as taught by the *Śruti*. *Abheda* implies that *paratantra* can never be separated from *svatantra*, i.e., it can never exist independent of *Svatantra*. *Paratantra* therefore is *ananya* but Brahman is transcendent. It transcends all that is the world. *Bhg. T.* 21 says, "Because *Sattā*, etc., of *Viṣṇu* are *Svatantra*,

He is different (*Anyā*) from the world. And because all else derives *sattā*, etc., from Brahman, though it is by nature different from Brahman, it is identical (*ananya*) (with Brahman)."⁷²

So, Madhva concludes *An. V. 3. 2. 46*, "Bhagavān, and Bhagavān only, is taught by all the Vedas."⁷³ *Bhg. T. 59*, "Those that have little or no knowledge do not see Brahman as the only meaning of the Vedas, but he alone who has pure knowledge sees only Brahman as taught by them."⁷⁴ *Anu. V.*—"Therefore the object of enquiry is the Dearest, the All-complete Vāsudeva, the Secondless Parabrahman The Highest."⁷⁵

Thus the *Brahmavāda* of Madhva establishes how Brahman, the Ground of all, is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*. Madhva says: the contemplation of this Truth is an immediate joy and a joy for ever. This is Madhva's philosophy of *Ānanda* (Brahman) and for this reason he is rightly called *Ānanda Tīrtha*.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Anu.V.</i> .. <i>Anu Vyākhyāna</i> , by Madhva.	<i>Tai.Bh.</i> .. <i>Taittirīya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva.
<i>Ai.Bh.</i> .. <i>Aitareya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva.	<i>T.C.</i> .. <i>Tātparya Candrikā</i> , by Vyāsārāja.
<i>Bhg.T.</i> .. <i>Bhāgavata Tātparya</i> , by Madhva.	<i>T.Pr.</i> .. <i>Tattva Prakāśikā</i> , by Jayatīrtha.
<i>Br.Bh.</i> .. <i>Brhadāraṇya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva.	<i>T.S.T.</i> .. <i>Tattva Sankhyāna Tikā</i> , by Jayatīrtha.
<i>Br.S.Bh.</i> .. <i>Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva.	<i>V.T.V.</i> .. <i>Viṣṇu Tattva Vinirṇaya</i> , by Madhva.
<i>M.Bh.</i> .. <i>Māndūkya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva.	
<i>N.S.</i> .. <i>Nyāya Sudhā</i> , by Jayatīrtha.	